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Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: A Threat to Child
Support?
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Alaska became the first state to pass a usable statute
allowing the creation of domestic asset protection trusts (DAPTs). 1
Delaware was quick to follow, passing asset-protection legislation of
its own later that year. 2 Since then, a total of fourteen states have
passed legislation allowing the creation of DAPTs. 3 The impetus
behind this legislation has been the respective states’ hope for an
increase in trust business and the revenue that it would generate. 4 In
order to achieve this result, the DAPT statutes are structured so that
settlors must utilize services within the DAPT state 5—such as

1. Timothy Lee, Alaska on the Asset Protection Trust Map: Not Far Enough for a
Regulatory Advantage, but Too Far for Convenience?, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 149, 149 (2012).
Alaska’s statute is codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2012).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570 (2012). A desire to not be “outdone” by Alaska’s
new statute appears to have been a driving force behind the adoption of Delaware’s statute. See
Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, Synopsis, H.R. 356, 139th Gen. Assemb., 71 Del. Laws
159 (1997) (explaining that the Act is “intended to maintain Delaware’s role as the most
favored domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts”).
3. See COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS STATE DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUST
STATUTES (David G. Shaftel ed. 2012), [hereinafter COMPARISON] available at
http://shaftellaw.com/docs/DAPTStatutes_June2012update_Final.pdf (counting thirteen
states with DAPT legislation, but noting uncertainty whether Colorado has truly passed a
DAPT statute and also noting pending DAPT legislation in Ohio, which, if both states were
included, would bring the total to fifteen states). Ohio has since passed the DAPT legislation.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5816 (West 2013).
4. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 156–62 (discussing the legislative history behind the
passage of the Alaskan statute allowing DAPTs, including various statements by Alaskan
representatives). Lee concludes that “a primary motivation for [the] . . . ultimate passage of the
bill was the economic growth of Alaska.” Id. at 162; see also Act 182, 2010 Haw. Sess. Laws
592, § 1 (“The intent of this Act is to offer incentives to high net-worth individuals
throughout the United States and throughout the world to transfer a portion of their liquid
net worth into this State for asset and trust management. This Act is designed to increase the
assets under management by Hawaii’s private financial sector, [and] increase state tax
revenues . . . .”).
5. See John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust
Alternatives Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV.
41, 56 (2000) (“Both Alaska and Delaware have designed their statutes to increase trust
business within the respective states, by imposing certain trustee and administration
requirements upon the creditor-protected trust.”).
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requiring trust assets to be deposited within the state and requiring
trust administration to be done by a state resident or company. 6 In
also a bid to attract trust business, many states have chosen to
severely limit or entirely abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. 7 By
eliminating the effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities, so-called
dynasty trusts can be created, 8 which are exempt from the
generation-skipping transfer tax. 9
While it is unclear whether these states have achieved their goal
of increasing revenue, 10 it is clear that the recent DAPT legislation
has had a significant impact on creditors’ rights. 11 As states vie to
become the top trust situs, states are incentivized to pass
progressively more debtor-friendly legislation in order to draw trust
business into their state. 12 Because of the perverse incentives it
creates, this competition has been dubbed a “race to the bottom.” 13
One question that states have been confronted with in passing
DAPT legislation has been how to treat child support—whether this
“creditor” claim would be treated the same as other claims, or
whether an exception would be made so DAPTs could not be used
to avoid child support claims. 14
6. See David D. Shaftel, Newest Developments in Alaska Law Encourage Use of Alaska
Trusts, 26 EST. PLAN. 51, 52 (1999).
7. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 373–76 (2005);
Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s Emergence as a Leading Trust
Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYO. L. REV. 165, 173–75 (2011); see also David M. Grant & Jeremy K.
Cooper, Nevada Laws Provide Top Trust Situs, NEV. LAW., May 2010, at 20, 22 (charting
states that have altered or eliminated the Rule Against Perpetuities and respective time
periods).
8. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 7, at 419.
9. Reimer, supra note 7, at 174.
10. For a discussion of whether these states have achieved their goal of increasing
revenue, see infra Part III.
11. Susanna C. Brennan, Changes in Climate: The Movement of Asset Protection Trusts
from International to Domestic Shores and Its Effect on Creditors’ Rights, 79 OR. L. REV. 755,
756 (2000).
12. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1114 (2000).
13. See id. at 1035; see also Christopher Paul, Innovation or a Race to the Bottom? Trust
“Modernization” in New Hampshire, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 353 (2009); John K. Eason, Policy,
Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2621, 2656 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 157–59 (describing the legislative discussions on how
child support would be treated under the proposed statute). “[I]t appears that with regards to
creditors’ rights, the legislators focused primarily on the potential claims of children . . . .” Id.
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While much has been written about the passage of DAPT
statutes in general, this Comment adds to the discussion by
specifically examining how states have tackled this question of how
to treat child-support creditors. The majority of states that have
passed DAPT legislation have included an exception for child
support; however, disparity exists among the states on the strength
of the exceptions and under what circumstances the exceptions
apply. 15 Furthermore, at least one state did not include any exception
for child support at all, in effect treating child-support claimants the
same as any other creditor-debtor relationship. 16 Such legislation is
troubling not only for its immediate effect on child-support
dependents of settlors in DAPT states, but for how this legislation
might pressure other states to eliminate child-support exceptions
from their own statutes in order to compete for trust business. This
Comment argues that states should include strong exceptions for
child-support dependents because the creditor-debtor relationship is
unique in this context, shielding of child support debts is immoral,
and the economic cost to society of not having an exception for
child-support claimants likely outweighs the economic benefits to
the states.
Part I of this Comment examines the history behind self-settled
trusts, including the traditional view of these trusts, the rise in the
use of off-shore trusts, and finally the creation of domestic asset
protection trusts. Part II summarizes the DAPT statutes that have
been passed, particularly focusing on how the respective statutes
treat child support, and also discusses why tax considerations are
likely the motivation behind some states choosing to provide little or
no protection to child support in their DAPT statutes. 17 Part III
explores policy considerations for including child support
exemptions in DAPT statutes; such as the unique nature of the
creditor-debtor relationship, and examines why tax considerations
may be driving states that have passed DAPT statues to eliminate all
exemption creditors (including child support “creditors”). 18 Lastly,
Part IV concludes that DAPT statutes that provide no exception, or
at 157.
15. For a summary of how the various DAPT states have treated child support, see
infra Part III.
16. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 166.010–170 (2012).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
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only a weak exception, for child support are a threat to child support
and should be disallowed for public policy reasons. 19
I. HISTORY OF DOMESTIC ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
In order to gain a better understanding of how DAPTs function,
it is useful to explore the background that gave rise to this type of
trust. This Part examines how spendthrift and self-settled spendthrift
trusts have traditionally been viewed by the courts. Next, the rise of
offshore self-settled spendthrift trusts is explored, and the advantages
and disadvantages of offshore trusts are discussed. Lastly, this Part
describes how offshore trusts provided the inspiration for DAPTs
and highlights the pros and cons of DAPTs as contrasted with
offshore trusts.
A. Traditional Principles Regarding Spendthrift Trusts
1. Spendthrift trusts
Historically, English law did not permit trusts to shield the trust
assets from attachment by creditors. 20 This law was carried forward
into America, whose laws were predominantly based upon English
laws. 21 However, in the 1875 landmark case of Nichols v. Eaton, 22
the United States departed from English law to allow so-called
“spendthrift trusts,” which permitted settlors to create trusts for
others that prevent creditors from attaching the beneficiary’s interest
in the trust. 23 While hotly contested at the time, 24 spendthrift trusts
are now readily accepted as a standard vehicle of trust law. 25

19. See infra Part IV.
20. Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1195, 1202 (2000).
21. Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-American Trust Law, 10
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 355, 361 (2009) (“American courts treated English precedents and
juristic writings as authoritative in day-to-day practice.”).
22. 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
23. Boxx, supra note 20, at 1201–02. The rationale behind allowing such spendthrift
trusts is explained in Sterk, supra note 12, at 1042 (“The rationale for enforcing spendthrift
trusts has been that the trust property belongs not to the trust beneficiary, but to the trust
settlor. Because the settlor has no obligation to transfer the property to the beneficiary, the
settlor is entitled to transfer it to the beneficiary subject to conditions, including the condition
that the property be shielded from the beneficiary’s creditors.”).
24. For a detailed history of the debate surrounding the decision allowing spendthrift
trusts, see Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB.
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2. Self-settled spendthrift trusts
Despite widespread recognition of spendthrift trusts after Nichols
v. Eaton, this recognition did not extend to spendthrift trusts created
for the benefit of the settlor. 26 The general principle prohibiting asset
protection for self-settled spendthrift trusts is illustrated by an
English rule from the fifteenth century: “all deeds of gift of goods
and chattels made or to be made [in] trust, to the use of that person
or persons that made the same deed or gift, be void and of none
effect.” 27 A more current formulation of this rule is encapsulated in
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which states:
(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a
provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his
interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest.
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support
or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the
maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust
could pay to him or apply for his benefit. 28

Thus, traditional trust law provides that if the settlor can
receive assets from the trust, such as in a self-settled trust, then
spendthrift provision is of no effect, and creditors can attach
settlor-beneficiary’s interest in the trust. 29 Until recently, this

still
any
the
has

L. REV. 179 (1993).
25. See Boxx, supra note 20, at 1202 (“Currently, all states give spendthrift provisions
some degree of recognition, although some states set limitations on enforcement of such
provisions.”); see also Sterk, supra note 12, at 1042 (“Courts and legislatures have responded
to this device with constraints of varying severity, but spendthrift trusts have nevertheless
become widely accepted.”).
26. Boxx, supra note 20, at 1202–03; see also Sterk, supra note 12, at 1043 (“[E]ven
more entrenched than spendthrift trust doctrine itself is the rule that a spendthrift provision for
the settlor’s own benefit is unenforceable.”).
27. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 287, 292–93 (2002) (quoting 3 Hen. 7, c. 4 (1487)).
28. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 156 (1959); see Darsi Newman Sirknen, Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts: What’s the Big Deal?, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 133, 133–34
n.4 (2006) for a list of cases that have adopted the Restatement’s view. The rule set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts has been carried forth in the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts. See Restatement (Third) of Trust § 58(2) (2003) (“A restraint on the voluntary and
involuntary alienation of a beneficial interest retained by the settlor of a trust is invalid.”).
29. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 624 (8th ed. 2009)
(“Under traditional law, the settlor cannot shield assets from creditors by placing them in a
trust for the settlor’s own benefit. Even if the trust is discretionary, spendthrift, or both, the
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been the law of the land in the United States. However, with several
foreign jurisdictions and now a number of U.S. States abrogating
this rule, settlors have many locations to choose from that allow
them to create a trust that is both self-settled and protected against
creditors. 30
B. Offshore Trusts
In the mid-1980s several foreign jurisdictions, many of them
small islands, designed a business scheme intended to drive trust
business to their countries. 31 The focus of these jurisdictions was to
create trust laws that would allow wealthy individuals to protect their
assets from creditors. 32 The most significant change to traditional
trust laws initiated by these offshore locations permitted a settlor of a
trust to have creditor protection despite being a beneficiary of the
trust. 33 Hence, under these foreign trust laws, “creditors may neither
compel a trust distribution nor attach the settlor’s trust interest in
satisfaction of the settlor’s debts.” 34
The efforts of these foreign jurisdictions have proved to be
extremely lucrative, as estimates indicate that between $1 and $5
trillion are located in offshore asset protection trusts 35 (OAPTs). 36
Currently, there are over sixty foreign jurisdictions from which to
choose, with some of the more popular offshore locations including
“the Bahamas, Belize, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.” 37
settlor’s creditors can reach the maximum amount that under any circumstances the trustee
could pay to the settlor or apply for the settlor’s benefit.”).
30. See infra Part III.B–C.
31. Danforth, supra note 27, at 306–07.
32. Id. Similar to the competition among U.S. states to become the top trust situs, the
competition among foreign jurisdictions to become the top international trust situs by passing
debtor-friendly laws has also been called a “race-to-the-bottom.” See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum,
Preface, The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 519, 524 (1999).
33. Eason, supra note 5, at 50.
34. Id.
35. Thomas M. Brinker Jr. et al., Demystifying Offshore Trusts: Capitalizing on a
Valuable Asset Protection Tool, 15 J. INT’L TAX’N 30, 32 (2004). The actual amount of assets
held in these accounts may be even higher, as others have estimated that as much as $6 trillion
exist in offshore trusts. See Danforth, supra note 27, at 310 (citing David Leigh, Billions
Hidden Offshore: Jersey Faces Clampdown, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Sept. 26, 1998, at 1).
36. Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating
It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 12 (1994).
37. Id. at 62; see also Denise C. Brown, Caribbean Asset Protection Trust: Here Comes the
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1. Advantages of offshore trusts
There are several reasons why OAPTs quickly gained popularity.
First, several factors make it harder for creditors to access funds held
in an offshore trust. One reason is that foreign jurisdictions are not
under “constraints imposed by the U.S. Constitution,” such as the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 38 Thus, if a creditor obtains a judgment
against a settlor in a U.S. jurisdiction, the foreign jurisdiction is not
required to, nor perhaps likely to, recognize this judgment. 39 While
it may be possible for the creditor to sue the settlor in the foreign
jurisdiction and obtain a judgment against the settlor there, this
process is burdensome and expensive. 40 Not only will the creditor
have to bring suit in that jurisdiction under foreign laws 41 but also
the creditor will find it harder to obtain a judgment because the
standard of proof is often higher than it would be in the United
States. 42 Additionally, the creditor must usually retain local counsel
instead of keeping his or her U.S. counsel, which can present
problems of its own. 43

Sun—Dispelling the Dark Clouds of Controversy, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (1998)
(also noting Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, and St. Kitts as favorable offshore asset protection
locations).
38. Reimer, supra note 7, at 168.
39. Brinker et al., supra note 35, at 60; See Debra Baker, Island Castaway, 84 A.B.A. J.
54, 55 (1998) for an article describing the plight of a divorcee trying to obtain funds her exhusband had put in a OAPT in a foreign jurisdiction that did not recognize U.S. judgments
including divorce decrees.
40. Brennan, supra note 11, at 768; see also David D. Beazer, The Mystique of “Going
Offshore”, UTAH B.J., Dec. 1996, at 19, 20–21 (noting that bond often must be posted before
a creditor can initiate a suit in a foreign jurisdiction). Additionally, “[l]egal enforcement action
against the APT requires that the litigation occur de novo in the foreign situs.” Id. at 20.
41. Brennan, supra note 11, at 768.
42. Id.; see also Marty-Nelson, supra note 36, at 60–61 (“[P]laintiff must prove his
pleadings beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard
adopted in U.S. civil proceedings.”).
43. Brennan, supra note 11, at 768 (“Most foreign attorneys demand that all of their
fees be paid up front.”); see also Beazer, supra note 40, at 20 (“[L]egal counsel in these foreign
jurisdictions will not normally work on a contingency fee arrangement.”). An interesting
problem that can arise when trying to obtain local counsel is that none are available to be
retained. Brinker et al., supra note 35, at 60 (“[I]n most offshore jurisdictions, the bank or
trust company that administers these trusts may have already retained all of the local lawyers. If
so, it will be impossible for the claimant to obtain local counsel without creating a conflict of
interest. When this happens, the intended result of asset protection has effectively been
achieved, because if local counsel cannot be retained, the claimant cannot bring the suit.”).
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Another reason it is harder to obtain a judgment in these
offshore locations is that the foreign jurisdictions often have a
shorter statute of limitations for claims than in the United States,
thus making it harder for the creditor to bring suit before the claim
is barred. 44 To further complicate matters, a cause of action that
exists in the United States may not even exist in these foreign
jurisdictions. 45 Even those creditors who can overcome these barriers
to successfully file suit in the foreign jurisdictions might find out that
their efforts are for naught, as “flight” clauses allow trustees to
simply move the trust assets to another jurisdiction before judgment
can be obtained, so that process begins all over again in another
jurisdiction. 46 Collectively, these barriers act as a great deterrent to
creditors, gradually wearing them down until they decide to stop
pursuing a fruitless claim. 47
A second advantage to OAPTs is that self-settled spendthrift
trusts have been allowed in foreign jurisdictions for several years
now, allowing some peace of mind to the settlor as to how foreign
and U.S. laws will be applied to these funds, while U.S. states
offering these types of trusts are a new development. 48 A third
benefit is that OAPTs offer a great deal of privacy for settlors due to
confidentiality laws in the foreign jurisdictions. 49 Lastly, having assets
in off-shore trusts can provide tax-saving benefits to the settlor. 50

44. Brinker et al., supra note 35, at 60 (contrasting the one-year statute of limitations
found in some foreign jurisdictions with the typical three- to five-year period found in the
United States); see also Marty-Nelson, supra note 36, at 61 (noting one attorney’s remarks that
the “practical effect” of these significantly reduced statute of limitations periods is that “by the
time you find out where the money is and file your action, the statute of limitations bars the
suit”).
45. Brinker et al., supra note 35, at 60 (“[M]ost foreign jurisdictions do not recognize a
[surviving] spouse’s right to an elective share against the estate.”).
46. Marty-Nelson, supra note 36, at 66.
47. Brinker et al., supra note 35, at 60 (“After one or two attempts to bring suit, a
rational creditor will conclude that the costs of pursuing the claim outweigh any potential
benefit.”); see also Sirknen, supra note 28, at 135 (“[T]he trust instrument may provide for a
change of trust situs if the assets are put in danger. Many creditors are not willing to follow a
trust as it flees from one jurisdiction to another, perhaps making several situs changes before
the creditor finally throws its proverbial towel into the ring.”).
48. See Reimer, supra note 7, at 168. Reimer notes that “for many years, the general
rule in U.S. jurisdictions was that trusts in which the settlor is also a beneficiary were against
the tenets of conscionability.” Id.
49. Beazer, supra note 40, at 21; see also Mario A. Mata, Frequently Asked Questions
Regarding Offshore Wealth Preservation, PRAC. TAX L., Spring 2004, at 27, 29 (“[O]ffshore
secrecy laws . . . provide clients, particularly very wealthy families, the ability to protect the
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2. Disadvantages of offshore trusts
Despite the popularity of offshore asset protection trusts, they
come with several disadvantages. First, OAPTs are very expensive,
with initial start-up costs around $18,500 and maintenance costs
running to several thousand dollars each year. 51 Second, a stigma is
often associated with the use of offshore accounts, 52 which may
dissuade some potential settlors from taking advantage of these asset
protection tools. 53 However, the general perception towards the use
of OAPTs may be positively increasing. 54 Third, political instability
is a risk in these foreign jurisdictions. 55
confidentiality of their financial affairs, a goal which is important to many wealthy families.”).
50. Reimer, supra note 7, at 168 (“[T]he U.S. Internal Revenue Code has been structured
so that settlors were allowed to take advantage of a number of estate and income tax
minimization techniques, further guarding the corpus of a trust and allowing unencumbered
growth in foreign jurisdictions.”).
51. Eric Henzy, Offshore and “Other” Shore Asset Protection Trusts, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 739, 740 (1999); see also Brennan, supra note 11, at 765–66 (“Asset
protection is an expensive venture; anyone considering the creation of an offshore trust should
have a net worth of at least $500,000 and be prepared to incur start-up costs of at least
$15,000 for a $1 million account along with a one percent yearly administration fee.”).
52. See Brown, supra note 37, at 142–43. A current example of the stigma associated
with offshore accounts was witnessed in the recent election, with some critics accusing
Governor Mitt Romney of “hiding” illegal activity in his offshore accounts. See Leon &
Marlene Schmidt, Letter to the Editor, Romney’s Offshore Accounts Raise Suspicion, THE
GAZETTE, Aug. 23, 2012, available at http://thegazette.com/2012/08/23/romneysoffshore-accounts-raise-suspicion/ (raising the possibility that Governor Romney had used
offshore accounts to avoid paying taxes).
53. See Eric E. Kalnins, What Does the U.S. Have Against Foreign Countries?, CBA REC.,
June–July 2010, at 46.
54. See Beazer, supra note 40, at 19 (“OFCs are no longer just sunny places for shady
people.”); see also Brown, supra note 37, at 137 (“Although the Caribbean APT has received
bad press in the past, it remains a legitimate asset protection and estate planning tool.”); see
also Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning
Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 149 (2007) (advocating that
“offshore asset protection trusts serve a legitimate purpose”). But cf. id. at 149 n.6 (noting
that “legal commentators disagree about the legitimacy of [OAPTs],” and comparing several
of these comments). Many of these favorable viewpoints of OAPTs are advocated either by
practitioners involved in the business of setting up these trusts or by legal commentators whose
knowledge of these asset protection tools assumedly far surpasses that of a normal lay person.
Hence, the unfavorable perception of OAPTs among the general population may likely remain
unchanged. See, e.g., Stephanie Mencimer, The Real Problem with Romney’s Offshore
Investments, MOTHERJONES.COM, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/mittromney-offshore-investments-cayman-islands (Sept. 25, 2012, 2:00 AM) (“Offshore tax
havens are better known for facilitating money laundering and tax evasion than legitimate
business.”).
55. Reimer, supra note 7, at 169 (Reimer also notes the risk of potentially
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Fourth, in recent years the United States has passed laws that
have substantially increased the reporting requirements for offshore
accounts and that have increased the civil and criminal penalties for
non-compliance with these requirements. 56 Additionally, some U.S.
courts have held settlors in contempt of court for failing to comply
with a court order to repatriate trust assets to the United States,
rejecting the settlors’ arguments (likely for good reason) that it is
impossible for the settlors to direct the disposition of the trust assets
under the terms of the trust instrument. 57 Because of the foregoing
reasons, some settlors may be hesitant to put funds in an OAPT,
particularly in light of the emergence of a new, viable asset protection
tool, the DAPT, which is discussed below.
C. The Emergence of Domestic Asset Protection Trusts
In 1997 Alaska became the first state to pass a statute allowing
for the creation of a DAPT. 58 This legislation was inspired by the
“offshore” countries’ success in attracting trust business. While on a
fishing trip together in Alaska, an attorney and his brother came up
with the idea of passing a DAPT statute that could compete with the
unenforceable trust terms and unaccountable trustees.); see also Marty-Nelson, supra note 36,
at 66 (“When investigating OAPTs . . . a settler need consider . . . the potential of a military
coup in the situs nation, and the subsequent consequences to the trust assets.”).
56. Christopher M. Reimer, International Trust Domestication: Migrating an Offshore
Trust to a U.S. Jurisdiction, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 170, 183 (2012); see also Danforth, supra
note 27, at 310 (noting the “onerous reporting requirements imposed on foreign trusts by the
Internal Revenue Code”).
57. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999). The court in
Affordable Media stated:
[W]e are not certain that the Andersons’ inability to comply in this case would be a
defense to a finding of contempt. It is readily apparent that the Andersons’ inability
to comply with the district court’s repatriation order is the intended result of their
own conduct[—]their inability to comply and the foreign trustee’s refusal to comply
appears to be the precise goal of the Andersons’ trust.
Id. at 1241. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset
Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987, 996–1000 (1999); see also In re Lawrence, 279
F.3d 1294, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The sole purpose of this [duress] provision appears
to be an aid to the settlor to evade contempt while merely feigning compliance with the court’s
order . . . . [W]here the person charged with contempt is responsible for the inability to
comply, impossibility is not a defense to the contempt proceedings.”), reviewed in
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 29, at 634.
58. See Lee, supra note 1. Apparently the idea to create a trust state that would compete
with OAPTs was conceived by a New York trust lawyer, his brother, and an Alaskan lawyer while
together on a fishing trip in Alaska. See id. at 156–57; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 29, at
625–26.
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offshore trust business. Since Alaska’s passage of its DAPT statute,
several more states have followed suit, bringing the number of states
that have passed DAPT legislation to fourteen. 59 The fundamentals
of DAPTs are discussed below, along with the advantages and
disadvantages of these asset protection tools.
1. Structure of DAPTs
Conceptually, DAPTs are very similar to OAPTs. Like an OAPT, a
DAPT allows a settlor to create a self-settled spendthrift trust that
provides asset protection against the settlor’s creditors. 60 DAPTs are
generally irrevocable trusts, 61 although one state has allowed a DAPT
to be revocable. 62 As noted above, the creation of revenue through the
passage of DAPT statutes was a driving force behind their passage. 63
Thus, DAPT statutes were designed in such a way as to increase trust
business within the state. 64 Alaska’s statute is illustrative because it
requires that “some or all of [the] asset[s] be deposited in Alaska” and
that the trust be “administered by a ‘qualified person’ who is either an
individual who is an Alaska resident, or an Alaska trust company
or bank.” 65
2. Advantages of DAPTs
Commentators have noted several advantages of settlors placing
assets in a DAPT instead of an OAPT. First, the danger of political

59. See supra note 3.
60. Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685
(2006); See also COMPARISON, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that the “primary goals of DAPTs are
asset protection and, if so designed, transfer tax minimization”).
61. COMPARISON, supra note 3, at 2.
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 13 (2012) (“A preservation trust may be established as a
revocable and amendable trust . . . .”). Oklahoma’s departure from other DAPT states in this
regard is described in Hirsch, supra note 60, at 2687 (“Upon joining the bandwagon in 2004,
Oklahoma added its own, intriguing wrinkle: Uniquely among the states, Oklahoma allows
asset protection trusts to be made revocable, in whole or in part, and explicitly bars creditors
from using judicial process to force settlors to exercise the retained right of revocation. Hence,
in effect, settlors can impress a self-settled trust in Oklahoma with a restraint on involuntary
alienation without simultaneously restraining voluntary alienation. By exercising a reserved
right of revocation, wholly personal to themselves, settlors can recover the corpus at will, but
creditors cannot touch it.”).
63. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
64. See Eason, supra note 5.
65. Shaftel, supra note 6.
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instability associated with some foreign jurisdictions is greatly
reduced, 66 along with the potential problem of unaccountable
trustees. 67 Settlors may take comfort that their assets are located in
the United States instead of in an offshore location. 68 Second, while
DAPTs do not necessarily have a “sterling” reputation, their use may
be held in a higher regard than the use of OAPTs. 69 Third, a DAPT
is not as expensive as an OAPT, making DAPTS more accessible to a
greater number of people. 70
3. Disadvantages of DAPTs
Although DAPTs offer some advantages over offshore trusts,
DAPTs also have potential drawbacks that may make them not as
attractive as OAPTs. 71 One significant limitation is uncertainty
concerning how conflict of laws principles and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution 72 will affect the application of
DAPTs. 73 This uncertainty may arise when a creditor brings suit

66. Sterk, supra note 12, at 1051.
67. See Brinker et al., supra note 35, at 35 (“[P]erpetual trusts created in the U.S. offer
some significant advantages to the grantor . . . [including] a greater degree of certainty
concerning the administration of the trust . . . .”).
68. Henzy, supra note 51, at 741. See also id. at 741 n.10 (quoting Lynn M. LoPucki,
Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1415 (1998)) (“Americans can
now judgment proof-themselves without transferring their money and the titles to their
properties to strangers offshore.”).
69. One commentator has noted that a state’s effort to increase the favorable perception
of DAPTs within its state can be seen by how the state has named its DAPT statute. See Dan
Holbrook, The TIST Test: Tennessee Competes for Trust Dollars, 43 TENN. B.J. 21, 21
(“Because ‘asset protection’ may hint at something shady, with visions of widows and orphans
eating dog food, or bankrupt businessmen leaving creditors holding the bag while they retire
for life at their villa in the Caymans, Tennessee’s law refers to our version of DAPTs
euphemistically as ‘Tennessee Investment Services Trusts,’ or TISTs.”).
70. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 779; See Henzy, supra note 51, at 740–41 (noting
that the cost to create a DAPT is between $6,000 and $12,000 in contrast with cost of
$18,500 that can be required to create an OAPT).
71. One commentator has gone so far to suggest that DAPTs simply cannot compete
with the asset protection offered by OAPTs. See Eason, supra note 5, at 63 (“It is impossible
for any state in the U.S. to offer the same degree of protection as offshore jurisdictions that
have high burdens of proof, virtually no recognition of foreign judgments, the English rule for
taxing attorney’s fees as costs, and extremely short limitations periods in which to seek
avoidance of a transfer claimed to be fraudulent.”); Cf. Sterk, supra note 12, at 1051 (opining
that despite DAPTs offering less asset protection than OAPTs, the former may still be able to
compete for trust business with the latter due to DAPTs’ advantages over OAPTs).
72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
73. See Paul, supra note 13, at 365.
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against a debtor in a non-DAPT state and then seeks to enforce the
judgment from the debtor’s assets held in a trust set up in a DAPT
state. 74 While the trust assets may be protected under the DAPT
state’s law, this may not be the case under the non-DAPT state’s
laws. 75 Despite the conflict of laws between the two forums, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would usually require that a judgment
rendered against the debtor in a non-DAPT state be honored in a
DAPT state. 76 Hence, it is very important to know which state law
(DAPT or non-DAPT) will be applied. 77
a. Determining which state law governs. Several factors must be
considered to determine which state law governs. It is extremely
common for the settlor of an asset protection trust to insert a choice
of law provision in the trust instrument, designating the laws of the
jurisdiction that allow the asset protection trust to govern the trust. 78
Normally, courts will honor a choice of law provision in a trust
instrument when deciding general questions about how the trust is
to be administered. 79 Hence, if the dispute is brought in a DAPT
74. See Eason, supra note 5, at 67.
75. Many of these DAPT states have passed more restrictive laws regarding what
constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Hence, under the fraudulent transfer laws of a non-DAPT
state, a creditor may be able to prevail and reach the trust assets, but would fail if the DAPT
state’s laws were applied. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 1052 (“Alaska’s fraudulent conveyance
law is not creditor-friendly. . . . Alaska’s fraudulent conveyance statute requires proof of actual
fraud and includes no conception of constructive fraud. Also, it extinguishes any fraudulent
transfer claim after four years from the time of the transfer, even if the creditor’s claim did not
arise until after the transfer; thus, if the settlor creates a trust, anticipating and seeking to avoid
possible future liability, the settlor will succeed so long as the liability does not arise—or the
creditor does not sue—within four years after the settlor makes the transfer of property into
the trust.”).
76. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 790. Conversely, if the judgment were rendered in a
DAPT state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would compel the non-DAPT states to
“recognize the judgment upholding the validity of the domestic asset protection trust, even
though the trust’s provisions strongly conflict with the laws of those other [non-DAPT]
states.” Id.; Sirknen, supra note 28, at 152 (“Therefore, if a creditor sues a debtor in a non[D]APT state and wins a judgment, he should be able to enforce that judgment in a[] [D]APT
state against trust assets, even though the non-[D]APT state court may have misinterpreted or
declined to apply the law of the [D]APT state.”).
77. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 36, at 48 (noting that “it is vital to know which
state law governs”).
78. Sterk, supra note 12, at 1084 (“[V]irtually all asset protection trust instruments
expressly select the law of the favored jurisdiction.”).
79. See Brennan, supra note 11, at 788 (“As a general rule, states must respect the
settlor’s intent regarding which law governs the trust.”). But see Sterk, supra note 12, at 1084
(“[D]espite occasional language to the contrary in judicial opinions, the settlor’s intent is rarely
determinative on the issue of a trust’s validity, particularly when parties other than the settlor
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state and the DAPT was set up within the state, then the governing
law is easy to determine—the DAPT state will simply apply its own
law. 80 But, when suit is brought in a non-DAPT state, the answer is
not as clear.
Many commentators have argued that non-DAPT states may
choose not to apply the DAPT state’s law, despite the settlor’s
choice of law provision, if doing so would violate a “strong public
policy” of the non-DAPT state. 81 Two particular instances when a
non-DAPT state may determine that enforcing the law of the DAPT
state would violate a “strong public policy” of the non-DAPT state
are (1) claims regarding fraudulent conveyances and (2) disputes
determining whether a spendthrift provision in self-settled trusts
should be enforced to protect the settlor from claims brought by
creditors. 82 Many DAPT states have tried to overcome this potential
and the beneficiaries are involved.”). Professor Sterk also notes that “[i]n the vast majority of
cases in which courts have applied the law of the trust situs, the situs coincided with the
forum,” id., indicating that the settlor’s intent may not be as helpful in predicting which choice
of law will govern when the trust situs is not located within the forum state.
80. Sirknen, supra note 28, at 155.
81. Eason, supra note 5, at 70 (“It is widely accepted that a choice of law provision may
be ignored where the laws of the expressly chosen jurisdiction offend the public policy of the
forum state in which a legal action concerning the trust is brought.”); Henzy, supra note 51,
at 754 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979)) (“The ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not require a State to apply another State’s . . . law in violation of its own legitimate
public policy.’”). But see Sirknen, supra note 28, at 155 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 273 (1971)) (“[A] creditor may argue that APTs offend the public
policy of the forum state so the court should ignore the trust’s governing law. This would be
an especially compelling argument in the case of a forum state resident who settles an APT in a
different state, in a dispute with a creditor that is resident in the forum state, over a transaction
that occurred solely in the forum state. Section 273 of the Restatement, however, provides that
‘[w]hether the interest of a beneficiary of a trust . . . is assignable by him and can be reached by
his creditors is determined . . . by the local law of the state . . . in which the settlor has
manifested an intention that the trust is to be administered.’ This section does not provide a
different rule in the case where the trust’s governing law violates a strong public policy of the
forum state. At least one practitioner argues that this means that a court should follow a trust’s
governing law without question when addressing the ability of creditors to reach trust
assets.”). While the recent case of In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013),
involved a bankruptcy court applying federal choice of law principles, the concern that a choice
of law provision can be set aside by a court for violating a public policy of the forum state
appears to be a valid one. In Huber, the bankruptcy court determined that Washington, and
not Alaskan, law should apply to determine the validity of an Alaskan DAPT, in part due to
Washington having a strong public policy against DAPTs. See id. at 809.
82. Sterk, supra note 12, at 1075; See Henzy, supra note 51, at 751–52 (“Under [a
non-DAPT state] law, it is against public policy to permit a settlor-beneficiary to tie up his
property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching
it.”); Eason, supra note 5, at 70 (“[A] non-DAPT forum may find the self-settled DAPT a
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obstacle by including legislation with their DAPT statute that grants
them exclusive jurisdiction over any matters concerning trusts within
their state. 83 However, such legislation is likely to have little to no
effect on a non-DAPT state’s decision to apply its own law if the
DAPT state’s laws would offend its state’s public policy. 84
b. Full Faith and Credit Clause. As noted above, if a judgment is
obtained in a non-DAPT state against a DAPT, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution requires that the DAPT state
honor this judgment. While there is a chance that the DAPT state
may choose not to honor the judgment of the non-DAPT state
because it violates its own public policy, 85 this possibility is extremely
slight. 86 Therefore, a big disadvantage of choosing a DAPT over an

violation of its state’s public policy, and, therefore, the forum court may apply the laws of the
state in which it sits and refuse to recognize the trust as a valid protection against the claims of
the settlor’s creditors.”).
83. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Veit, Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts and the Alaska Trust Act:
Has Alaska Moved Offshore?, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 269, 279 (1999) (construing ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.36.035 (2012)); Eason, supra note 5, at 69–70 (“[A] DAPT created under Alaska or
Delaware law is required to include a provision designating that state’s laws as governing.”).
84. See Veit, supra note 83, at 287 (“An out-of-state court is likely to hear a fraudulent
conveyance action regarding an Alaska Trust in spite of the Act’s purported grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the Alaska courts over ‘proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the
internal affairs of trusts.’”).
85. See Reimer, supra note 56, at 181 (“[T]here is an argument that a Wyoming court
should not enforce such judgments [of a non-DAPT state] because they conflict with the
strong public policy of the forum state.”).
86. See Veit, supra note 83, at 287 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 103 (1971) (amended 1989)) (“Finally, the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution would require that Alaska give full effect to the judgment of an
out-of-state court that a transfer to an Alaska Trust was a fraudulent conveyance. The only
possibly applicable exception recognized by the Restatement is likely irrelevant. Section 103
declares that a state need not recognize or enforce the judgment of another state if such
recognition or enforcement would ‘involve an improper interference with important interests’
of the state being asked to enforce the judgment. The comment to the Restatement provision
describes the application of this exception as ‘extremely narrow.’ A state’s ‘strong public
policy’ against enforcement of the claim will not suffice to constitute interference with
important interests.”); See Henzy, supra note 51, at 754 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998)) (“While ‘a court may be guided by the forum State’s “public
policy” in determining the law applicable to a controversy . . . [the Supreme Court’s]
decisions support no roving “public policy exception” to the full faith and credit clause.’
Thus, absent fraud or lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, the courts of a state must
recognize a judgment from a state or federal court in another state, even if such judgment is
not consistent with local policy or law.”). Some commentators have noted that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause treats legislative acts and judgments unequally since a forum state may
disregard the non-forum state’s statutory law more easily than a non-forum state may
disregard judgments from the forum state. See Bryan Nichols, “I See the Sword of Damocles Is
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OAPT is the possibility that a non-DAPT state may apply its own
law, resulting in the DAPT state being required to enforce
the judgment. 87
However, as the number of states that allow DAPTs has
increased and will likely continue to increase in the future, the odds
steadily decrease that a court in a non-DAPT state will find that
these trusts violate the public policy of that state because these trusts
are then less of an anomaly. 88
c. Personal jurisdiction issues. In addition, the non-DAPT state
must have either personal jurisdiction over the trustee or in rem
jurisdiction over the trust assets, since the trust assets are no longer
held by the settlor. 89

Hanging Above Your Head!” Domestic Venue Asset Protection Trusts, Credit Due Judgments,
and Conflict of Law Disputes, 22 REV. LITIG. 473, 484 (2003) (“[The Full Faith and Credit
Clause], by its language alone, creates a firm principle of judicial and legislative comity
between states: both the laws and judicial pronouncements of sister states must be accepted
by the state in question. That the full faith and credit clause requires parallel treatment of
judgments and legislative acts is self-evident. However, the disparity between what appears to
be obvious and what has actually occurred is quite prevalent.”); See Henzy, supra note 51, at
754 (“[T]he full faith and credit obligation is more exacting in the case of judgments.”).
87. Veit, supra note 83, at 287–88 (“The full faith and credit clause distinguishes the
protection of the offshore trusts from the protection of an Alaska Trust. . . . A transfer to an
offshore trust would be far more impervious to attachment by creditors because of the
judgment’s unenforceability.”).
88. See COMPARISON, supra note 3 (“The fact that fourteen states now have DAPT
statutes moves this approach from the eccentric anomaly category to an accepted asset
protection and transfer tax minimization planning technique. As more and more states enact
DAPT statutes, the conclusion that a non-DAPT state has a ‘strong public policy’ against a
DAPT trust seems less likely.”); See Danforth, supra note 27, at 325 (“As more states adopt
[D]APT and other debtor-friendly legislation, courts in those jurisdictions will become less
inclined to find that the foreign state’s [D]APT law violates their public policy. Moreover, even
in states without [D]APT legislation, courts in those states may recognize the myriad ways in
which their own state laws allow non-[D]APT devices (such as limited partnerships and
tenancies by the entirety) for protecting against creditors’ claims and thus be disinclined to find
that the foreign [D]APT legislation violates its public policy. In these two significant respects,
we can anticipate that recovering from [D]APTs will become increasingly more difficult.”); See
Brennan, supra note 11, at 787 (“[A] creditor may also bring an action attacking the validity of
a domestic asset protection trust based on its self-settled nature. [Some cases] indicate courts’
willingness to use this rule, either directly or indirectly, to strike down an offshore asset
protection trust. However, if other states follow Alaska and Delaware’s lead in repealing the
rule against self-settled trusts, a breakdown in the respect for and use of this rule may result.”).
89. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 1089 (“Once the settlor transfers property to the asset
protection trust, a personal judgment against the settlor is of limited value, because the settlor
no longer claims any legal interest in the property. The trustee, not the settlor, becomes the
creditor’s adversary in the dispute over legal ownership of the trust property.”); Eason, supra
note 5, at 68 (citations omitted) (“‘The prior judgment would not affect directly interests in
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If the non-DAPT forum state does not have personal jurisdiction
over the trustee, the DAPT state has no obligation to enforce the
judgment against the settlor. 90 While a creditor could bring an action
in the DAPT state having personal jurisdiction over the trustee, 91 this
would add considerably to the cost of litigation, and is likely to deter
most creditors from pursing their claim. 92 Likewise, while in rem
jurisdiction may be easy to obtain for real property located in the
non-DAPT state, a creditor may have difficulty establishing in rem
jurisdiction over other property because the location of the property
is not as easily ascertained. 93 Accordingly, as long as DAPT trustees
are careful to minimize their contact with non-DAPT states and trust
assets are held within the DAPT state, a creditor’s ability to obtain
judgment is greatly reduced. 94
the [trust] property nor would it impose obligations on the trustee.’ More specifically, the
forum ([non-DAPT]) state must have jurisdiction ‘over the particular person or property in
question’ to enter a valid judgment entitled to enforcement against such person or property
under full faith and credit principles.”).
90. Eason, supra note 5, at 68 n.97 (construing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
254–56 (1958)) (noting Hanson v. Denckla, in which the Supreme Court held “that state of
trustee domicile was not bound to give full faith and credit to judgment rendered by state of
settlor’s and most beneficiaries’ domicile, where second state lacked personal jurisdiction over
trustee”).
91. See Danforth, supra note 27, at 325 (“[T]he creditor must obtain a judgment from
a court having personal jurisdiction over the trustee.”).
92. See Keith Adam Halpern, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: What Is Your State of
Asset Protection?, 7 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 139, 149–50 (2008) (“[O]ne may have a losing
battle enforcing a [non-DAPT] court’s judgment upon a [DAPT] trustee. Unless the [DAPT]
trustee has the required minimum contacts with the judgment debtor’s state, the judgment
creditor will likely be required to obtain . . . counsel [within the DAPT state], domesticate the
judgment to [the DAPT state], and re-initiate portions of the litigation all over again. This
double expense (probably closer to triple) is a practical dissuading mechanism to a creditor
pursuing a judgment. . . . Geography is, of course, a completely unsophisticated reason to stop
a valuable claim, but it has prevented unaccounted scores of claimants due to the legal fees
necessary to access trust assets.”).
93. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 1097 (“When tangible property, particularly real
property, is involved, establishing the location of that property will generally be
straightforward. However, when intangible property—partnership interests and corporate
shares—is at stake, the creditor faces serious difficulties.”).
94. See Danforth, supra note 27, at 325 (“Savvy trustees, seeking to protect the assets of
their [D]APT clients, will undoubtedly structure their affairs to minimize the risk of subjecting
themselves to personal jurisdiction in states that do not recognize [D]APTs.”); Sterk, supra
note 12, at 1090 (“The creditor, however, has no apparent basis for obtaining personal
jurisdiction over a [DAPT] trustee, so long as the trustee has taken care not to solicit business
outside the trustee’s home jurisdiction.”); Eason, supra note 5, at 69 (“The trustee’s contacts
with the non-DAPT state and the location of trust property are . . . crucial considerations in
the establishment and administration of any [DAPT], as the wrong decision here could
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d. Contracts clause challenges. Another potential challenge to
DAPTs may come from a creditor claiming that the DAPT statutes
authorizing the creation of DAPTs are void since these statutes violate
the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 95 The Contracts
Clause prohibits states from passing laws that “substantially impair the
obligations of parties to existing contracts or make them unreasonably
difficult to enforce.” 96 By allowing settlors to protect their assets
mitigate strongly in favor of the judgment creditor. Thus, a primary consideration for both the
asset protection attorney and the transfer tax planning attorney is the selection of a trustee with
a policy of minimizing personal jurisdiction contacts with states other than the DAPT
jurisdiction, the laws of which are intended to govern trust affairs.”); Sirknen, supra note 28, at
153 (suggesting that “[t]o prevent a non-[D]APT court from having jurisdiction, the trustee
should be a resident of the [D]APT state or a corporation doing business only in the [D]APT
state (so that it does not have ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state), and the trustee
should hold all trust assets within the [D]APT state (so that a non-[D]APT court cannot have
in rem jurisdiction over trust assets)”).
Conversely, if such precautions are not taken, the creditor may more easily reach the
assets held in the DAPT. Eason, supra note 5, at 69 (“If the forum state has jurisdiction over
the trustee and/or trust property, then the DAPT is clearly vulnerable. . . . If such personal
jurisdiction is found to exist and due process requirements are otherwise complied with, the
asset protection sought could easily be lost as a result of litigation in the non-DAPT
jurisdiction.”).
One commentator has suggested that instead of waiting for the trust to be attacked, the
trustee should bring a declatory judgment action in the DAPT state so that the trust’s validity
will be decided by the DAPT state. See Sirknen, supra note 28, at 155–56 (“The trustee[] [has
the] option . . . to take an offensive posture and bring a declaratory judgment action in the
[D]APT state. Obviously, the [D]APT state will use its own law to uphold the trust, and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause will require other states to uphold that judgment. Although the
[D]APT state courts may not have personal jurisdiction over the creditor, they will most likely
have jurisdiction over the trust assets, since all [D]APT statutes require at least some of the
assets to be held within the [D]APT state. If the trustee sends notice of the proceeding to the
creditor and gives him an opportunity to come defend his position, the creditor can still be
bound by the judgment of the [D]APT state. Thus, creditors existing at the time of the
declaratory action will be estopped from bringing later challenges to the trust.”). But cf. Jay
Adkisson, Will Declaratory Judgments Be the Savior of Domestic Asset Protection Trusts? Probably
(Apr.
27,
2013,
1:08
PM),
Not,
FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2013/04/27/will-declaratory-judgment-actionsbe-the-savior-of-domestic-asset-protection-trusts-probably-not/.
95. Lee, supra note 1, at 171; Boxx, supra note 20, at 1230; Eason, supra note 5, at 67
(“One author considers this avenue of attack as ‘probably the only viable Constitutional claim
that could potentially obliterate the new [domestic] asset protection trust laws.’”) (citing Leslie
C. Giordani, Asset Protection: Domestic and Foreign Planning Alternatives, 33 S. FED. TAX.
INST., Oct. 1998, app. B at W-70 ). The Contracts Clause can be found at U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10, cl. 1.
96. Lee, supra note 1, at 171 (quoting Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection: Trust
Planning, SJ036 ALI-ABA 1419, 1446 (ALI-ABA C.L.E. Annual Advanced Course of Study
Nov. 17-21, 2003). For a brief history of the Contracts Clause, see Boxx, supra note 20, at
1230.
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behind the shield of DAPTs, creditors may argue that this has
impaired their contractual rights to reach the assets that would have
been available to them before the passage of the DAPT statutes. 97
However, the Contracts Clause does not apply to future creditors, 98
and there is a strong counter argument that the contractual rights of
existing creditors have not been impaired; rather, merely the remedies
available to these creditors to enforce these rights have been affected. 99
Thus, most commentators feel that such a challenge would not
present a real threat to the success of DAPTs. 100
II. DAPTS AND CHILD SUPPORT
As noted previously, a chief consideration among states that have
passed DAPT legislation is how each respective state would treat child
support claims. 101 Some legislators were concerned that settlors could
utilize DAPTs to avoid alimony or child support payments. 102
Accordingly, most states included some sort of exception for child
support. 103 However, not all states included such an exception, and

97. Leslie C. Giordani & Duncan E. Osborne, Will the Alaska Trusts Work?, 3 J. ASSET
PROTECTION, Sept.–Oct.1997, at 7.
98. Lee, supra note 1, at 171. The Contracts Clause also does not apply to tort victim
“creditors.” Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Domestic Asset-Protection Trusts: Part I, 40
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 263, 331 (2005).
99. See Giordani & Osborne, supra note 97, at 8 (“[O]ne defense would be an argument
that fraudulent transfer laws offset the impairment of creditor/debtor contracts inherent in
Alaska’s new law, providing present and foreseeable creditors with a viable remedy when faced
with a debtor who has transferred assets to avoid his or her repayment obligation.”). Even if a
creditor can successfully argue that the DAPT statute has “substantially impair[ed]” an “existing
contractual obligation,” the creditor will still be out of luck if a court determines that the “state
[had] a justifiable purpose for passing the law and . . . the legislature narrowly drafted the statute to
achieve that purpose.” Boxx, supra note 20, at 1231.
100. See, e.g., Eason, supra note 5, at 67 (“[I]t would seem that such an argument is
tenuous, at best . . . .”); Sirknen, supra note 28, at 153 (“[DAPTs], however, should not be
vulnerable under [the Contracts Clause] because the clause prohibits impairment of existing
contracts, and most [D]APTs have an exception that allows creditors existing at the time the
trust is created to bring claims within a certain number of years.”).
101. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 157–59; Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale:
Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That
Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 831, 860–64 (1999).
102. See, e.g., Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 860–61.
103. See COMPARISON, supra note 3. In including an exception for child support, these
states followed the general principle that spendthrift clauses do not prevent child support
“creditors” from being able to reach the beneficiary’s interest in the trust. See Wagenfeld, supra
note 101, at 844 (“United States courts will generally enforce spendthrift trusts that are created
by the settlor for the benefit of a third party. However, there are several exceptions to this
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even for those states that did include an exception in their DAPT
statutes, the exceptions often vary in the language that is used and in
the conditions necessary to be applicable.
Hence, in order to determine whether DAPT statutes are a
threat to child support, it is necessary to examine the language of
these child support exceptions when included in the statute. 104 The
DAPT statutes can be grouped into three categories, depending on
whether the DAPT statute included a strong exception, 105 a weak
exception, 106 or no exception at all. 107
A. States with a Strong Child Support Exception
The majority of states have included exceptions in their
respective DAPT statutes that appear to offer a significant amount of
protection for child support. States that fall into this category are
Delaware, 108 Missouri, 109 New Hampshire, 110 Oklahoma, 111 Rhode
Island, 112 South Dakota, 113 Tennessee, 114 Ohio, 115 Virginia, 116 and
Wyoming. 117
Some of these exceptions explicitly state that child support
creditors can obtain a court judgment allowing attachment of trust
assets. 118 For instance, Missouri’s DAPT statute states, “a
beneficiary’s child . . . who has a judgment against the beneficiary for
support or maintenance . . . may obtain from a court an order

practice. In most cases, judgments for child support or alimony can be enforced against the
debtor’s interest in a spendthrift trust.”).
104. Much of the information in this summary was based from a chart created by David
G. Shaftel. See COMPARISON, supra note 3.
105. See infra Part III.A.
106. See infra Part III.B.
107. See infra Part III.C. Since it is unclear whether Colorado truly has DAPT
legislation, see COMPARISON, supra note 3, it was not included in this analysis.
108. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 12, § 3573 (2012).
109. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 456.5–503.2 (West 2012).
110. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D:15 (2013).
111. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 31, § 12 (West 2013).
112. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18-9.2-5 (West 2013).
113. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15 (2013).
114. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-16-104 (West 2013).
115. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5816 (West 2013).
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-744 (West 2013).
117. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-520 (West 2013).
118. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573 (2012).
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attaching present or future trust income.” 119 Other exceptions simply
state that the protections afforded in the DAPT statute do not apply
to child support creditors. 120
B. States with a Weak Child Support Exception
Some states included an exception for child support in their
respective DAPT statutes that provides only weak protection for
child support. The three states that fit into this category are
Alaska, 121 Hawaii, 122 and Utah. 123 For example, Alaska’s DAPT
statute provides that creditors of the settlor (including child support
“creditors”) may attach the funds that the settlor transfers into the
trust, but only if the settlor is in default thirty days or more of a
court order judgment or order for child support. 124 Similarly,
Hawaii’s statute states that the restrictions placed on creditors “to
avoid permitted transfers” by the settlor to the trust do not apply to
child support claimants, but only apply if the settlor is in default
“thirty days or more of making a payment due under the agreement
or order.” 125
Under such a statutory scheme, it is easy to imagine possibilities
where a settlor could avoid child support. 126 For example, so long
as a settlor made sure to be up-to-date with child support, or a
settlor ensured that he or she was not in default for not paying
child support more than thirty days, the settlor could fund the
trust, which could then not be reached. 127 As such, these child
support exceptions prevent settlors from creating a DAPT trust
only if child support creditors exist at the time of the transfer to
fund the trust and offer no protection to child support after the
trust is created. 128 For instance, this situation may arise if a settlor’s

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 456.5–503.2 (West 2013).
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15 (2013).
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (b)(4) (2012).
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 554G–9(1) (2012).
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (2013).
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (b)(4) (2012).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 554G–9(1) (2012).
See Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 860–61.
Id.
See Lee, supra note 1, at 163.
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child is born after the creation of the trust, in which case the trust
assets would be out of reach for any child support judgment. 129
C. States with No Child Support Exception
At the extreme of the DAPT spectrum is Nevada, which did not
provide any exception for child support creditors. Nevada’s DAPT
statute reads as follows:
[T]he interest of the beneficiary [shall not] be subject to any
process of attachment issued against the beneficiary, or to be
taken in execution under any form of legal process directed
against the beneficiary or against the trustee, or the trust estate,
or any part of the income thereof, but the whole of the trust
estate and the income of the trust estate shall go to and be
applied by the trustee solely for the benefit of the beneficiary,
free, clear, and discharged of and from any and all obligations of
the beneficiary whatsoever and of all responsibility therefor. 130

Because Nevada’s DAPT statute does not include any exception
for child support claimants, it presents the greatest threat to child
support. Nevada’s decision not to include an exception for child
support is alarming because in a “race to the bottom” 131 to become
the top trust situs, Nevada’s law has become the new standard for
other states. 132
D. Tax Considerations Drive the Race to the Bottom
At first glance, the states that included little or no protection for
child support in their DAPT statutes might appear to have done so
129. Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 861.
130. NEV. REV. STAT. §166.120 (2012) (emphasis added).
131. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
132. For instance, Utah, which once provided a strong exception for child support,
recently amended its statute to severely weaken this protection. Somewhat similar to Alaska’s
and Hawaii’s statutes, Utah’s statute requires that settlors must sign an affidavit, swearing that
they are not in default of paying child support at the time assets are transferred into the fund.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14 (5)(h) (2013). Before distributions can be made to the settlorbeneficiary, the trustee must give thirty days advance notice to any child support dependent of
the settlor, letting them know of the impending distribution. However, the statute does not
provide a way for the child support dependent to attach the distribution before it happens.
Assumedly, the child support dependent must go to court each time a distribution is to be
made to have a chance at getting the assets, by which time the assets may have already been
depleted. Consequently, the exception (if it can be called one) has little teeth in protecting
child support dependents.
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in an attempt to be the “best” asset protection situs—i.e., the state
could then market DAPTs set-up in its state as being completely
creditor proof, even from child support claimants. While this factor
may be part of the equation, a different factor, specifically estate tax,
more likely explains why certain states, such as Nevada and Alaska,
did not include an exception for child support.
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 2036 states that a person’s
property will be included in that person’s estate for estate tax
purposes if the person retains “the possession or enjoyment of . . .
the property.” 133 In other words, if creditors can reach trust assets,
the question arises whether the settlor still retains possession or
enjoyment of the property. If the answer is yes, then trust assets are
included in the settlor’s estate when the settlor dies.
Applied in the DAPT context, I.R.C. § 2036 means that trust
assets can potentially be included in the settlor’s estate and increase
the amount of estate taxes that must be paid if child support
claimants can reach the trust assets. In analyzing whether a settlor
still wields power over trust assets under I.R.C. § 2036, it is
irrelevant that a settlor would likely object to and attempt to prevent
the transfer of trust assets to a child support claimant; rather, the
mere possibility of such a transfer may be indicative of the settlor
retaining “possession or enjoyment of” trust assets. Because estate
tax reduction is a key feature that makes DAPTs attractive to
potential settlors, whether a state’s DAPT statute allows for estate
tax reduction under I.R.C. § 2036 is an extremely important
consideration, and possibly the deciding factor, in which state a
settlor chooses to set up a DAPT.
When states considered the best structure for their DAPT
statutes, they were keenly aware of this issue. 134 The solution for
some states was simple—make DAPTs in their state impervious to all
creditors. Alaska’s statute, for example, was “clearly intended to
completely shield these trusts from any claims of creditors.” 135 Other
states, such as Delaware, also intended their DAPT statute to provide
settlors with estate tax benefits, 136 but also included an exception for
child support. However, because Delaware’s statute includes this

133.
134.
135.
136.

26 U.S.C. § 2036 (2012).
See, e.g., Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 861–62.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 865.

499

DO NOT DELETE

4/14/2014 11:30 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

exception for child support, its statute is less likely to provide this
estate tax benefit. 137
For several years after the creation of DAPTs, the IRS declined to
rule on whether these trusts would be included in the settlor’s
estate. 138 In 2009, the IRS ruled favorably for assets held in an
Alaskan DAPT, stating that they would not be included in the
settlor’s estate for estate tax purposes. 139 However, a recent ruling
potentially establishes that only DAPTs that do not allow any
creditors (including child support creditors) to reach trust assets are
the only type of DAPT that provides these tax benefits for settlors. 140
Although the current IRS stance is unclear, if such protection from all
creditors is necessary to provide estate tax benefits, states now have a
strong incentive to structure their DAPT statutes to prevent all
creditors from reaching trust assets, thus making the threat of people
using DAPTs to avoid paying child support even greater.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
DAPT statutes that do not include strong exceptions for child
support violate important public policy considerations. These
considerations mainly revolve around the immorality of allowing
settlors to hide assets from child support claimants, but potentially
include economic considerations as well.
In evaluating how DAPTs without strong exceptions for child
support have already affected or are likely to affect child support, there
is currently a lack of data to analyze. A purview of the relevant case law
did not turn up any cases involving DAPTs and child support; the case
law on DAPTs in general appears to be very sparse. 141 Some

137. See Veit, supra note 83, at 293–94.
138. See id. at 293.
139. David G. Shaftel, IRS Letter Ruling Approves Estate Tax Planning Using Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts, 112 J. TAX’N 213, 216 (2010), available at
http://shaftellaw.com/docs/article_31.pdf (reviewing I.R.S. P.L.R. 2009-44-002 (Oct. 30,
2009)).
140. I.R.S. P.L.R. 2013-10-002 (Mar. 8, 2013).
141. See Paul, supra note 13, at 363 (“[T]he author is unaware of any domestic appellate
court that has enforced a judgment against a qualified disposition in a DAPT. . . .DAPTs are
new devices that have yet to be tested.”); Sirknen, supra note 28, at 158 (“Despite hundreds
of trusts being created, however, the author has been unable to find any case in which a
creditor has brought a challenge to a domestic APT.”); Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 875
(“[W]hether the recent legislation will accomplish this unique combination of benefits to
settlors and the potential detriment to creditors has yet to be tested by a court.”); see also
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commentators may view this dearth of case law as evidence that
DAPTs are not a threat to child support. Admittedly, there are
compelling reasons why case law may be lacking in this area; settlors
who have enough assets to set up a DAPT are likely not the type of
people who are going to shirk paying child support, 142 and they are
also more likely motivated to create a DAPT to obtain estate tax and
general asset protection benefits then to stiff child support
dependents. 143 Additionally, even if it was the intention of a settlor to
avoid paying child support, some commenters have suggested that in
DAPT states lacking a strong child support exception, the courts
would prevent settlors from doing so by creating a judicial exception
for child support, regardless of the statutory language. 144 Lastly,
because the total number of DAPTs appears to be very small, 145

David D. Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts and the Bankruptcy
Challenge, 32 EST. PLN., May 2005, at 24 (“[T]here are no decisions testing a DAPT against
another state’s strong public policy that would disallow a self-settled spendthrift trust.”).
Since the initial draft of this paper, at least one case has involved a bankruptcy court
invalidating an Alaskan DAPT set up by a Washington settlor. See In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013). In Huber, the bankruptcy court, applying federal choice of law
principles, determined that Washington, and not Alaskan, law should apply because the trust
did not have a substantial relation to Alaska, and because Washington has a strong public
policy against DAPTs. Id. at 808–09.
142. See Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 861 (“[T]he Assistant Attorney General
speculated that anyone who has the assets required to set up this type of trust is not likely to
have the intentions of avoiding child support obligations.”).
143. See supra, Part II.D.
144. See Eason, supra note 5, at 61 (“[R]elevant to both the Nevada and Alaska statutes is
one commentator’s opinion that the Delaware ‘exception for . . . child support . . . is an exception
that would almost certainly exist even if it were not in the statute because it is highly unlikely that
any court in the U.S. would permit a child to go without support while the settlor/parent was
living—perhaps very well—on funds received from a retained interest in trust.”) (citing Richard
W. Nenno, Delaware Law Offers Asset Protection and Estate Planning Benefits, 26 EST. PLN., Jan.
1999, at 8). See also Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 862 (“The drafters and legislators [of the
Alaskan DAPT statute] apparently were convinced that no injustice would occur [to child support
claimants], because Alaska courts would be deciding such cases so they could make the
subsequent changes if necessary.”).
145. Sirknen, supra note 28, at 158 (footnotes omitted) (“As of 2003, a little over five
years after the first [D]APT legislation became effective, a Delaware practitioner estimated that
‘a few hundred’ Delaware [D]APTs had been created with a market value exceeding $2 billion.
He also indicated that ‘several’ Nevada [D]APTs and ‘a few’ Rhode Island [D]APTs had been
created. An Alaska practitioner estimated that 310 nonresidents and 125 residents of Alaska
had created Alaska [D]APTs. It is almost certain that more trusts have been created in the last
couple of years, but these numbers are still not astronomical considering the total population
of the United States, or even the population of the [D]APT states alone.”).
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DAPTs are not likely to affect “more than a handful of people
each year.” 146
Regardless of whether DAPTs have been used to avoid paying
child support, DAPTs pose a real and potent threat to child support
because the plain language of these statutes clearly permits settlors to
shield their assets from child support claimants. Moreover, it seems
unlikely that a court would create a judicial exception for child
support when the language in the DAPT statute is unambiguously
clear concerning protection for trust assets against all creditors.
This threat is made even more real by the fact that as DAPTs
become more popular and well known, it is likely that the difficulty
and cost of creating a DAPT will be reduced, 147 making them
available to a greater number of people, who can potentially abuse
the system. Hence, what may now be an innocuous threat to child
support in the hands of good-intentioned settlors (at least
concerning paying child support) could turn into a vicious tool
against child support as ill-intentioned deadbeats learn of and utilize
these trusts. While there is certainly uncertainty regarding how these
trusts will be used going forward, that very uncertainty justifies
greater statutory protection for child support, whose importance
should be valued higher than a state’s desire to increase trust revenue
within the state. DAPT states without a strong exception for child
support should not recklessly keep such a readily available option
that allows deadbeat settlors to victimize child support dependents.
The following two sections further develop the public policy
considerations mentioned above. The first section discusses the
immorality of allowing such deadbeat settlors to avoid paying child
support. The second section attempts to provide a purely economic
analysis of whether allowing such action is desirable, and tentatively
concludes that allowing such action is unwise from an economic
standpoint.
A. Child Support—A Moral Duty
There are several ways to analyze the issue of whether DAPT
legislation that does not contain a strong exception for child support

146. See id. at 157–58 (quoting Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protection for
Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1335 n.17 (1984)).
147. For instance, websites such as Legalzoom.com may in the future offer a lower-cost
alternative to setting up a DAPT.
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should be disfavored due to public policy considerations. Some legal
scholars may fervently argue that the issue should be addressed solely
under an economic analysis, and such an analysis is included below;
however, this issue begs the question: should money even matter
when deciding? For some, the answer is resoundingly no.
Some duties are of such importance that states should not create
incentives for persons to disregard them. One such responsibility is
the moral duty for one to pay one’s debts. 148 While directed at
spendthrift trusts in general, one commentator has argued that
paying one’s debts is not only the “right thing to do,” but “there is
something disturbing about a country that would allow debtors to
leave their debts unpaid and still enjoy an extravagant lifestyle.” 149
Although many states permit this principle to be routinely
disregarded through spendthrift trusts created for the benefit of
others, alimony and child support claimants are almost universally
granted “special” status, thereby preventing the debtor from
avoiding the payment of such claims. 150
Such exceptions for child support and alimony appear to be
grounded in the reasoning that these duties are “sacrosanct” and, as
such, are worthy of legislative protection. 151 In other words, the
unique and special relationship between family members, in
particular the relationship between parents and children, comes with
attendant responsibilities and duties that trump basic duties owed to
other third parties. To allow settlors to use DAPTs to avoid these
duties would be “reprehensible.” 152 Or as one commentator has
declared, if courts truly “care about family, this [result] shouldn’t be
allowed.” 153

148. See Danforth, supra note 27, at 364.
149. Id. (citing Professor Boxx).
150. Marty-Nelson, supra note 36, at 44–46; accord DUKEMINIER, supra note 29, at
636.
151. See In re Loomis, 587 N.W.2d 427, 432 (S.D. 1998) (citing Golden v. Lewis, 647
So. 2d 979, 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); Jones v. Hammond, 329 S.W.3d 331, 340 (Ky.
App. 2010).
152. Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587, 593 n.l (Wyo. 2003); see DUKEMINIER,
supra note 29, at 636; Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 874 (“The problem with this means of
raising state revenue [through passing DAPT legislation] is that well-settled concepts of
fairness in creditors’ rights issues are being sacrificed. This has the potential to cause offensive
outcomes where spouses and children of settlors are denied support payments.”).
153. Baker, supra note 39, at 55 (noting the use of DAPTs to defraud spouses).
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Moreover, child support claimants may have an even stronger
case than alimony claimants. Unlike former spouses, who at least
presumably had a choice whether to “contract” with the settlor
through marriage, children of these settlors had no choice whether
they would “contract” with their settlor-parent. Rather, their
relationship with the settlor arises from the settlor’s actions. Because
the blame for the “creditor-debtor” relationship rests in total or at
least in part on the settlor-parent and not at all with the child, then it
should be against public policy for settlors to be able to avoid paying
the child-support dependent.
B. Economic Analysis
Whether DAPT statutes should include a strong exception for
child support can also be analyzed under a purely economic basis. In
other words, do the costs of not having a strong exception for child
support exceed the benefits that these DAPTs derive from not
having such an exception? Because of a lack of data in this field, an
answer to this question is not readily available. But some factors may
indicate that the costs to these DAPTs states could exceed any
benefit to these states, in which case not including a strong
exception for child support in DAPT statutes is not economical. A
further discussion of this analysis follows.
1. Economic benefit
As previously noted, revenue creation has been the main impetus
behind states passing DAPT legislation. 154 While there is “tentative
evidence” that DAPT statutes in general have increased trust
business in the states that have passed these statutes, the magnitude
of their effect is vague. 155 Furthermore, it is even more unclear to
what extent, if any, DAPT statutes that do not contain a strong
exception for child support increase trust business within their
respective states in comparison to DAPT statutes that do contain
strong exceptions.

154. See Lee supra note 1, at 162.
155. Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 7, at 411–12. While it is unclear to what extent
the passage of DAPT statutes has affected states’ trust business, states that have abolished the
Rule Against Perpetuities have seen on average an increase of twenty percent of trust business
within their respective state. Id., at 410–11.
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It is important to note, however, that any increase in trust
business from not including a strong exception for child support
would not directly benefit the state as a whole; rather, any direct
benefit would go to only a select group of financial institutions or
professionals (e.g., trust lawyers) involved in the creation and
administration of these trusts. 156 Regulatory capture by those
involved in the trust business can possibly explain the successful
passage of DAPT statutes despite such lopsided distribution of
benefits. 157 However, these states and the population as a whole may
indirectly benefit through the increased generation of taxes from
these institutions and individuals or through the influx of additional
money in the state’s economy. 158
2. Economic cost
Similar to researching any benefits from DAPTs that lack a
strong child support exception, there is also a lack of data concerning
the potential costs caused by these statutes. Throughout the nation
in general “[o]ver $100 billion is owed in unpaid child support,”
with “nearly half of that to taxpayers supporting children on public
assistance.” 159 However, it is unknown to what extent any of this
amount is owed by DAPT settlors, and in particular, by DAPT
settlors in states that do not have a strong child support exception.
Importantly, unlike potential benefits of DAPTs lacking a strong
child support exception, which would directly benefit only a small
group with the DAPT state, the economic costs of these statutes
would more likely be borne by all taxpayers of the state if settlors
avoided paying child support. Moreover, the cost for the settlor’s

156. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 1060 (“The competition for trust business . . . differs
from the competition for corporate charters in one significant respect: Filling the state
government’s coffers does not appear to be a major factor motivating trust-friendly
jurisdictions. . . . Jurisdictions seeking to become trust havens . . . appear content to draw
business to local financial institutions and lawyers, even without direct benefit to the public
fisc.”). Regulatory capture by those involved in the trust business can possibly explain the
successful passage of DAPT statutes despite such lopsided distribution of benefits.
157. See id. at 1060 n.126 (“Organized interest groups, including the bar and trust
companies, seek legislation that will enable them to generate more business, even at the
expense of other local residents (particularly creditors).”).
158. See Wagenfeld, supra note 101, at 859.
159. Steve Hargreaves, Deadbeat Parents Cost Taxpayers $53 Billion, CNN MONEY (Nov.
5, 2012, 5:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/05/news/economy/unpaid-childsupport.
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child support avoidance could not only include the state’s current
financial assistance to the child, but also other potential harm
associated with children growing up in poverty. 160
Also, it is significant that the potential economic costs of these
DAPTS do not necessarily have to fall to the DAPT state. A DAPT
set up in a DAPT state without a strong exception for child support,
such as Nevada, could potentially allow a settlor to hide assets from a
child support claim arising in another state, such as California, which
does not allow DAPTs at all. 161 In this regard, a state that has a
DAPT without a strong exception for child support can cause a
negative externality on other states.
Moreover, DAPT states with smaller populations may have to
internalize even less economic costs as they likely have a lower
number of local settlors in comparison to foreign settlors. 162 Since
settlors and child support claimants are likely to reside in the same
state, these states are able to externalize the majority of any potential
costs to other states. 163 As more states likely join the DAPT
competition, however, trust business will be drawn away from these
smaller states, in part, and be dispersed among these new DAPT
states. 164 If this occurs, it is even more likely that the potential
economic costs caused by not having a strong exception for child
support will outweigh any benefit to these states. 165 However, in
such a scenario it is unlikely for any one state to change its DAPT
statute to support child support because it would then receive no
benefit but would still bear the costs associated with these
statutes. 166 Hence, unless all states contract with each other to
eliminate the externalizing effect of these trusts, or Congress acts to
prohibit these types of trusts, 167 states with a DAPT statute lacking
strong protection for child support will have an incentive to keep
their statutes intact.
160. For example, such harm could include “poor heath” and the increased cost of
“health care and incarceration.” See Understanding Poverty, URBAN INSTITUTE,
http://www.urban.org/poverty/consequencesofpoverty.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
161. The cost could also be borne by other DAPT states, both those with or without a
strong exception for child support.
162. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 1069.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 1069–70.
166. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 1070.
167. See Danforth, supra note 27, at 366.
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IV. CONCLUSION

DAPT statutes that do not include a strong exception for child
support present a real threat to child support. While most DAPT
states included strong exceptions for child support in their DAPT
statutes, three states—Alaska, Hawaii, and Utah—included only
weak exceptions for child support, and one state—Nevada—did not
include an exception for child support at all. Because of estate tax
considerations and in order to compete with other DAPT states,
more states are likely to eliminate or weaken any exception for child
support in their DAPT statutes
Despite a lack of evidence that DAPTs in these latter states are
currently being used to avoid paying child support, these states’
DAPT statutes and the likely trend that other states will pass similar
statutes are troubling because the plain language of these statutes
would permit settlors to avoid paying child support. Such avoidance
of child support through the use of DAPTs is immoral because of
the “sacrosanct” duties parents owe to support their children and the
unique nature of the creditor-debtor relationship. Moreover, while
somewhat unclear, an economic analysis also supports the conclusion
that DAPTs without strong exceptions for child support are
unjustified because revenue from such trusts would directly benefit
only a small, select group of people within the DAPT states, yet the
potential cost of such statutes is borne by everyone in the state where
the child resides. Accordingly, for these public policy concerns,
DAPT statutes that do not contain a strong exception for child
support should be disallowed, stopping trust law’s “race to the
bottom” in this area.
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